

Codebook “Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process” by Sona N. Golder in *Comparative Political Studies* (2010).

1 Dataset : delay.dta

1.1 Variables

These variables are taken from Muller & Strom (2000) unless otherwise indicated.

COUNTRYNAME

Names of countries used in analysis.

COUNTRY

Unique number identifying each country.

CABINET

Unique number identifying each country. Begins with country code, followed by cabinets 1 - n .

CABINETNAME

Cabinet name identified by surname of prime minister (followed by a number if the PM presided over more than one cabinet).

BARGAININGDAYS

The number of days between either an election or the resignation of the previous government and the day on which the new government is officially inaugurated.

DATEIN

Date on which a government took office. Format is YYMMDD.

DATEOUT

Date on which a government left office. Format is YYMMDD.

POSTELECTION

Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a government is the first to form after an election (more uncertainty) and 0 if it forms in an interelection period (less uncertainty).

NONPARTISAN

Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the government is nonpartisan and 0 otherwise.

LEGISLATIVE_PARTIES

This variable is calculated as $1/\sum s_i^2$, where s_i is the percentage of legislative seats won by the i^{th} party.

INCONCLUSIVE

The number of inconclusive bargaining rounds prior to a new government successfully forming.

SINGLEPARTY_MAJORITY

Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a single party controls a majority of the legislative seats, 0 otherwise.

POLARIZATION

Measures the level of ideological polarization in the party system.

This measure is calculated as $K \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_i^{\alpha+1} \pi_j |y_i - y_j|$, where n is the number of parties, π_i is the size of party i , y_i is the ideological position of party i , K is a constant (and is, therefore, not important here), and α is a parameter that can take on values between $(0, \alpha^*)$. As Esteban and Ray (1994) recommend, α is set equal to 1.6. The overall polarization measure comes from Indridason (2006), who uses several expert surveys to calculate the party positions.

CONTINUATION

Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the outgoing government or formateur gets the first opportunity to form a new government, 0 otherwise. Data for this variable come from DvR (1998). Of the four countries in my dataset that are not in DvR (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom), only the UK has this feature (Bogdanor 1995, 147-150).

POSITIVE_PARL

Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a new government requires the explicit support of a legislative majority in order to take office, 0 otherwise (Bergman 1995).

1.2 Variables created when running the “results.do” file

Several interaction terms are created in the do file, all involving multiplying a variable with the POSTELECTION variable. They are the following:

POST_LEGISLATIVE_PARTIES is POSTELECTION \times LEGISLATIVE_PARTIES;
POST_POLARIZ is POSTELECTION \times POLARIZATION;
POST_POSITIVE is POSTELECTION \times POSITIVE_PARL

References

- Bergman, Torbjörn. 1995. “Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation: An Analysis of Winning Minority Governments in Sweden.” Ph.D Thesis, Department of Political Science, Umea University (Sweden).
- Bogdanor, Vernon. 1995. *The Monarchy and the Constitution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
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- Esteban, Joan-María & Debraj Ray. 1994. “On the Measurement of Polarization.” *Econometrica* 62(4):819–851.
- Indridason, Indridi. 2006. “Coalition Formation and Polarization.” Manuscript, University of Iceland.
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